The legal basis for parliamentary control of Government expenditure dates back to the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 and Parliament’s decision to legalise the standing army but provide its expenses only for 12 months in advance. This 12-months in advance principle was extended to other areas of Government expenditure until, by 1830, all civil government expenditure was provided on this basis. Six key principles or rules now govern what has become known as the Estimates process.
The principles or rules governing the Estimates process are derived variously from practices of the House of Commons stretching back to the early eighteenth century, from Standing Orders, and in some instances from statute.
Resources are authorised by Parliament only for use in the financial year set out in the Supply and Appropriation Act. The original purpose behind this rule was to prevent the Government hoarding surplus money from one year to the next and then spending it in ways not authorised by Parliament. This annuality rule was first applied in the 1862-63 session, following a recommendation from the then newly-established Committee of Public Accounts in 1861. The rule is now formally set out in the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 and is important in the context of NAO auditing of government accounts at the end of the financial year.
Expenditure resolutions must, subject to certain exceptions, be given statutory effect in the parliamentary session in which they are passed (although this has been disapplied from time to time, including in relation to the post-2011 shift in the start and end of parliamentary sessions from autumn to spring. The rule is now regarded as far less important than it used to be).
Standing Order No. 48 states that the House of Commons will:
"receive no petition for any sum relating to public service or proceed upon any motion for a grant or charge upon the public revenue, whether payable out of the Consolidated Fund or the National Loans Fund or out of money to be provided by Parliament, or for releasing or compounding any sum of money owing to the Crown, unless recommended from the Crown."
The provision that the House will only consider expenditure proposals made by the Crown dates back to an Order of the House of Commons on 11 June 1713 which stated "That this House will receive no Petition for any sum of money relating to public services but what is recommended from the Crown." This Order gave the Government the sole power of financial initiative in Parliament. It was partly designed to limit ‘pork barrel’ politics by MPs seeking funds for local constituency expenditure but with little or no regard for the nation’s finances.
Control of spending can be exercised only by the House of Commons, not by the House of Lords. The Parliament Act 1911 provides that all Supply and Appropriation Bills must be certified as Money Bills and can receive Royal Assent without the consent of the Upper House.
In practice, Supply and Appropriation Bills go to the House of Lords but their passage there is a formality: such Bills are not printed and are not debated or amended.
Preliminary approval of expenditure by MPs must be given in a resolution of the House prior to legislation to enact the spending plans.
Standing Order No. 49 sets out that "Any charge upon the public revenue whether payable out of the Consolidated Fund or the National Loans Fund or out of money to be provided by Parliament including any provision for releasing or compounding any sum of money owing to the Crown shall be authorised by resolution of the House."
The Supply and Appropriations Bill for final authorisation of the release of monies from the Consolidated Fund to departments can therefore only be brought forward once the House has considered the Supply motions. In the same way, the Finance Bill follows consideration of the Budget motions.
Spending can only be for the purposes approved by Parliament, as set out in the ‘ambit’ of each departmental Estimate. The National Audit Office (NAO) audit function provides a check at the end of the year on whether or not departments have spent money only for the purposes approved by Parliament.
The UK Spending Review outlines how Government funds will be allocated over several years. Unlike the Budget, which raises revenue, the Review decides how it is spent. But how is it approved? What role does Parliament play if it doesn’t vote on the Review itself? This blog explores how the Spending Review works, how it differs from the Budget, and how Parliament holds the Government to account through the Estimates process.
On Friday 13 June, the House of Commons will once again debate the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill, which would legalise assisted dying in England and Wales. Specifically, it will hold a second day of Report Stage, during which the whole House will debate and vote on amendments. This briefing explains the structure of Report Stage, what happened on the first day of Report Stage, how amendments are selected and grouped, on which amendments a decision can still be taken, and the likely sequence of events this Friday, including whether a final vote will take place.
The Chancellor, Rachel Reeves MP, will deliver a statement on the Spending Review. MPs will resume Report Stage of the assisted dying bill and debate key legislation on football governance, mental health, and planning and infrastructure. Peers and MPs are expected to resolve their standoff over AI and copyright in the Data (Use and Access) Bill. The Commons Defence Committee will hear from the lead reviewers of the Strategic Defence Review, while a Lords Committee will examine the Chagos Archipelago sovereignty issue. The Hansard Society’s Director will give evidence to the Modernisation Committee about access to the House of Commons and its procedures.
In this episode, we explore why ministers keep bypassing Parliament to make major announcements to the media — and whether returning to the Despatch Box might help clarify their message. We unpack the Lords' uphill battle to protect creators’ rights in the Data Use and Access Bill, challenge claims that the Assisted Dying Bill lacks scrutiny, and examine early findings from a Speaker’s Conference on improving security for MPs, as threats and intimidation against politicians continue to rise. Please help us by completing our Listener Survey. It will only take a few minutes.
Our evidence on treaty scrutiny has been published by the House of Lords International Agreements Committee. Our submission outlines the problems with the existing framework for treaty scrutiny and why legislative and cultural change are needed to improve Parliament's scrutiny role. Our evidence joins calls for a parliamentary consent vote for the most significant agreements, a stronger role for Parliament in shaping negotiating mandates and monitoring progress, and a sifting committee tasked with determining which agreements warrant the greatest scrutiny.
